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Riots and demonstrations have spread across Bosnia and Herzegovina since 4 February,
with many protesters calling for the resignation of the country’s government. Denisa
Kostovicova writes on the reasons behind the civil disorder, including the delicate ethnic
balance between Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. She argues that
the primary cause of the riots is widespread corruption, which privileges networks of elites
while disenfranchising the majority of Bosnia’s citizens.
Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina has again made headlines nearly twenty years after the bloody war that
saw the worst atrocities on European soil since the Second World War. Government buildings burned,
while protesters clashed with police. Unrest spread from cities to towns as crowds chanted ‘Thieves!
Thieves!’ and demanded the resignation of their political leaders.
Missing the cause
Analysts have explained the public revolt as the result of Bosnia’s dire economic situation, rampant
unemployment and systemic corruption. These depictions of what actually propelled the people to take to
the streets miss a subtle but important nuance. It was captured succinctly in the words of one demonstrator:
‘All of them are networked.’
Economic inefficiency, abuse of public office and lack of jobs are all symptoms of a weak state built
through networks that connect political, economic and ethnic elites. In my collaborative work with Dr Vesna
Bojicic-Dzelilovic, we explored how networks forged in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina adapted
themselves in the post-war period. They have penetrated the state, turning the government itself into a
façade. What now appears as a dysfunctional state is in actual fact a very functional system that distributes
the privileges, but only to the networked.
Local politicians responded instantly by blaming the ‘hooligans’. But the geography of the destruction,
including the number of government buildings targeted alongside offices of Bosnian Croat and Bosnian
Muslim parties in the southern town of Mostar, is more than a signature of wanton violence. Rather than
symbols of public service, administrative buildings are the embodiment of the misuse of public office and
instruments of personal gain at the expense of the public good.
Their destruction was deplored by many peaceful protesters. Nonetheless, smouldering ruins have served
as a powerful message from disempowered and humiliated ordinary men and women who have decided to
say that ‘enough is enough’.
The ethnic dimension
Policy makers in Bosnia and in Western capitals have no doubt been relieved to see that the protests have
not turned into interethnic violence. Many analysts have stressed the ‘anational’ character of the social and
economic discontent. Yet, to write off the ethic dimension of protests is deeply misleading. Above all, aside
from token gestures, a lack of solidarity with protesters across ethnic divides is yet another sign of deep
divisions in Bosnia’s state and society. The puzzling question is why the protests seem to be predominantly
a Bosniak (i.e. the Bosnian Muslim) affair given that none of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia (Bosnian
Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims) has been spared from the predatory practices of its own
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elites.
The answer in part stems from Bosnia’s unworkable constitutional arrangement. The 1995 Dayton peace
settlement divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into two entities: Republika Srpska, comprising the Bosnian
Serbs, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, shared by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.
The Federation itself was further divided into ten cantons, resulting in layer upon layer of governing
structures, which has not only impeded governance, but also increased the opportunity for predation.
Another part of the answer is in the degree of support from ethnic patrons beyond Bosnia’s borders.
Croatia’s Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic rushed to visit the Bosnian Croat leadership in Mostar, in what
many would like to see as the capital of a separate Bosnian Croat entity. His choice of Mostar underwrites
his country’s foremost loyalty with Bosnian Croats rather than with Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state.
Similarly, Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic hastily summoned Republika Srpska President
Milorad Dodik, a supporter of Republika Srpska secessionism, to Belgrade. For Dodik, the protests are
‘proof that Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot survive internal challenges’.
This leaves Bosnian Muslims as the only believers that the solution for their woes lies exclusively within the
Bosnian state. Reactions from neighbouring Croatia and Serbia may be couched in terms of special
relations sanctioned under the Dayton agreement. Nonetheless, they remain a telling sign of centrifugal
forces challenging Bosnia’s integrity. Socioeconomic protests are embedded in ethnic fault-lines both
inside Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region.
Not quite the ‘Bosnian Spring’
The outpouring of rage at the political class has been dubbed the ‘Bosnian Spring’. Events on-going in
Bosnia share many features with the protests that swept North Africa and the Middle East. The involvement
of youth, the role of social media, the leaderless character of protests and the rejection of the political
system bring the Arab Spring to mind. But while their Arab counterparts demanded democracy, Bosnia’s
predicament is precisely the result of democratisation and liberalisation.
Since 1995, the international community has firmly held Bosnia’s hand through post-conflict transition
premised on democratic and economic reforms. However, in combination with the complex political,
economic and ethnic legacy of the conflict, the liberal prescriptions have only entrenched ethnic democracy
and distorted marketisation. Hence, no democratic rhetoric will galvanise Bosnia’s protesters, disenchanted
with the democratic experiment. Might the dream of Europe work? What is increasingly emerging is
Bosnia’s exceptionalism in its resistance to the transformative power of Europe.
Bosnia’s position looks even starker in comparison with the EU’s recent success in the region. The EU has
achieved a breakthrough in the EU-sponsored Kosovo dialogue in what seemed to be intractable conflict
between Serbs and Albanians. The joint effect of Europe’s pull and the territories’ motivation to join the EU
delivered the result. Judging by the standstill in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s association process with the EU, the
country’s elites seem impervious to the lure of a European future.
Responding to the riots, the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina Valentin Incko, who represents the
international community actors which have practically run Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, said the EU
may deploy troops should the violence escalate. This is a simple answer, but it does little to address the
frustration of ordinary Bosnians about putting food on the table, getting a job on merit or seeing the law work
for all rather than just for the networked. The solution may not be simple, but one thing is clear. It certainly
does not lie with the country’s elites.
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Rik says:
February 11, 2014 at 9:13 am
Simply not a viable country, face it.
Elites running the show this way is perfectly normal for a country in Bosnia’s state of development. And so are large not in power
groups not interested in working things out together but rather running their own show. The latter makes it simply impossible to create
a national identity. Add a dislike between the groups and a history of violence and basically a will to use it again when deemed
necessary, long memories and you get where you are now, something that isnot going to work.
Same as in Northern Kosovo only there will a new split in whatever form be much easier.
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